Ahmed Nadhif | 21 Jun 2021
On 22 May 2021, the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for Libya Jan Kubis warned the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) that progress on the main issue of withdrawing mercenaries and foreign fighters from Libya had stalled, and that their continued presence posed a threat not only to Libya, but to the entire African region. This warning brought back to the fore the dilemma of mercenaries in Libya, after months of optimism in the wake of the political agreement that ended years of war, and stipulated in one of its clauses the need for all foreign forces to leave the country within 90 days. This paper sheds light on the issue of mercenaries in Libya, first by defining the map of foreign irregular armed forces in the country, and secondly by analysing the political and security repercussions of the presence of those mercenaries, both at the internal and regional levels, as well as trying to anticipate future paths for the development of this dilemma.
Ahmed Nadhif | 17 May 2021
On 23 April 2021, during a speech before the Italian House of Representatives, Libyan Foreign Minister Najla al-Mangoush announced that her country has contacted several countries to negotiate the removal of foreign fighters, which brought back to the forefront the discussion about the fate of those foreign fighters, how their countries of origin would deal with them, and the risks of their return, given that this return constitutes an increasing threat after it has been proved that some of those involved in terrorist acts in many countries are in fact returnee foreign fighters.
Tunisia was one of the countries included in this discussion, given that Tunisians account for a significant portion of the foreign fighters in Libya, as well as in Syria, considering that a large part of the Tunisian fighters currently in Libya have been active in the Syrian arena between 2012 and 2018.
This paper attempts to analyse the development of the phenomenon of Tunisian fighters returning from hotbeds of tension, its extent, and its implications, while examining the contexts of this return and its various impacts and challenges, internally and externally, and shedding light on the Tunisian government policies in dealing with the phenomenon of returning fighters and assessing its results.
Ahmed Nadhif | 13 Feb 2021
On 16 January 2021, Tunisian Prime Minister Hichem Mechichi announced a cabinet reshuffle which included 11 ministerial portfolios, including the ministries of justice and the interior. Afterwards, the country fell into a constitutional-political crisis after President Qais Saied refused to receive the new ministers who were chosen by Mechichi to take the oath after gaining Parliament’s confidence on 26 January 2021, on the grounds of suspicions of corruption and conflict of interests hovering around some of them. The Tunisian President also announced his objection to the measures that accompanied the reshuffle because, in his opinion, they lack a constitutional basis.
Bilal Abdullah | 21 Jan 2021
After weeks of the stalemate which followed the failure to reach a consensus among the participants in the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF), held in November and December 2020, over the mechanisms for selecting government office holders, as well as the faltering attempts to unify the divided parliament, the political settlement talks in Libya were resumed at the beginning of 2021, in conjunction with some regional and international moves in support of preserving the existing ceasefire. On the other hand, serious indications emerged of the presence of a large-scale military build-up. Those indications are mutually accumulating on both sides of the conflict, in addition to the occurrence of low-intensity clashes, coinciding with an escalation of rhetoric by the military parties to the conflict.
EPC | 31 Dec 2020
Morocco's interest in the African Sahel (Coast) region is attributable to the successive crises in the region, especially the Malian crisis, in addition to the growing activity of terrorist groups, as well as the threat of transnational organised crime which takes many forms, perhaps the most prominent of which are drug smuggling, human and arms trafficking, and kidnapping. This was confirmed by the latest Global Terrorism Index 2020 issued by the Sydney-based Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP).
Mostafa Kamal | 29 Dec 2020
Delay in reaching a political solution to end the Libyan crisis leads to the widening of the conflict over oil resources in this country, given that Libyan oil accounts for 93-95 percent of the total public revenues of the Libyan budget, and covers 70 percent of total spending. The continuation of the conflict has led to a decline in Libya's total daily oil production, from 1.6 million barrels per day before 2011 to 1.25 million barrels per day in 2020, after the resumption of oil production which was halted several times due to the intensification of the conflict. Libya is a member of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). While Libyan production falls within the minimum limit of the agreement to reduce production, which was estimated at 1.7 million barrels per day in September 2020, Libyan production constitutes an important factor in the oil price wars in the region.
EPC | 08 Jul 2020
Since the start of President Abdelmajid Tebboune’s term in office in December 2019, Algeria’s current interactions in its regional environment can be divided into three main circles: first, the Libyan circle with its recently experienced successive military and political developments; second, the African Sahel (Coast) circle which has become one of the circles constituting the most serious threats to Algerian security; and third, the Mediterranean circle that is of major strategic importance for Algeria, especially from the economic perspective.
EPC | 25 Dec 2019
Local and regional actors have expressed their anger at the memorandum of understanding for the delimitation of maritime boundaries in the Mediterranean Sea which Turkey and the Government of National Accord in Libya, under the leadership of Faiz al-Siraj, signed on 28 November 2019 in Istanbul. This paper will examine the main features of the deal, its position with regard to international law, and the legal, regional and international consequences.