On 3 October 2020, the Sudanese transitional government signed a peace agreement with the armed factions affiliated to the Revolutionary Front. The agreement comprised eight protocols, the most prominent of which are the security arrangements and the integration of the armed movements into a unified Sudanese army. However, this agreement was signed amidst the boycott of many armed movements, especially the Sudan Liberation Army, Abdul Wahid al-Nur’s Wing (SLA-AW), and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) (Abdel Aziz al-Hilu's Wing). This raises many questions about the future of the integration of the armed movements into the Sudanese army.
During his recent visit to Khartoum on August 25, 2020, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo had hoped to push the Sudanese government toward a rapprochement with Israel, but he left empty‑handed. This comes despite the earlier enthusiasm displayed by General Abdel Fattah al‑Burhan, Chair of the Sudanese Sovereign Council and Commander-in-Chief of the Sudanese Armed Forces, at the surprise meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in Kampala, Uganda, in February 2020. That meeting, arranged by the USA, is the only public meeting held between the heads of the two countries to date.
Ethiopia stands today at the threshold of a new phase of turmoil that threatens the country's unity, territorial integrity and social structure, after the escalation of the dispute between the Ethiopian Federal Government and the administration of the Tigray region as a result of the tension that prevailed over the relation between them over the past two years, and that recently witnessed a serious development, namely the launch by the Ethiopian army of a military attack against the region. This raises serious questions about the fate of the situation in Ethiopia and the future of the Tigray region in light of the ongoing conflict between the region and the federal government.
The domestic balance of power in Sudan after the fall of President Omar al-Bashir obliged the creation of a political system in which there were several different poles of decision-making, both de jure (i.e. constitutionally) and de facto. This state of affairs has greatly influenced foreign policymaking over the last year, with the new reality raising a pressing question: who makes Sudanese foreign policy? Answering this question will help us deal more appropriately with this country – a country of great importance to both Arab and African affairs.
The dispute between Sudan and Ethiopia over the Fashaqa border area has recently escalated. This is a long-standing dispute that began in the 20th century. This paper attempts to analyse and explore the consequences of escalation in the border dispute between the two neighbouring African countries in the light of the mechanisms adopted by the two sides to manage the dispute between them during 2020.
The Somali-Kenyan relations deteriorated once again after the Somali federal government announced, in mid-December 2020, that it is severing diplomatic relations with Kenya against the backdrop of what it described as "the Kenyan violations of Somalia's sovereignty and its open interference in Somalia’s internal affairs". Subsequently, Somalia ordered all its diplomats in Kenya to return to the country, and requested Kenyan diplomats in Somalia to leave its territory within seven days.
Despite the atmosphere of optimism surrounding the meeting between the Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta and Somali President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo at the opening of the recent extraordinary summit of the African Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) countries in the Djiboutian capital, the crisis seems likely to continue between the two sides until the date of the next Somali elections.
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