<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0"><channel><title><![CDATA[EPC Featured topics]]></title><description><![CDATA[EPC Featured topics]]></description><link>http://github.com/dylang/node-rss</link><generator>RSS for Node</generator><lastBuildDate>Thu, 23 Apr 2026 20:58:23 GMT</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https:/epc.ae/featured/feed" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><language><![CDATA[en]]></language><item><title><![CDATA[Turkiye and the US/Israel-Iran War: Position, Role and Geopolitical Calculations ]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p style="text-align:justify;">Turkiye has chosen to remain neutral in the Iran war, relying on diplomacy and balance, despite the risk posed by Iranian ballistic missiles. Ankara is exercising restraint to avoid being drawn into a wider regional conflict that could exploit its role within NATO.</p>]]></description><link>https:/epc.ae/details/featured/turkiye-and-the-us-israel-iran-war-position-role-and-geopolitical-calculations-</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https:/epc.ae/details/featured/turkiye-and-the-us-israel-iran-war-position-role-and-geopolitical-calculations-</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Turkey Studies Unit]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Thu, 16 Apr 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate></item><item><title><![CDATA[The UAE Transforming into a Middle Power Through Effective Strategies to Enhance Influence]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p style="text-align:justify;">The United Arab Emirates illustrates how a small state can amplify its global influence through economic diversification, technological innovation, and expansive strategic partnerships. Even amid great-power competition and regional tensions, its flexible, forward-looking strategy positions it as a resilient and increasingly consequential middle power.</p>]]></description><link>https:/epc.ae/details/featured/the-uae-transforming-into-a-middle-power-through-effective-strategies-to-enhance-influence</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https:/epc.ae/details/featured/the-uae-transforming-into-a-middle-power-through-effective-strategies-to-enhance-influence</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Dr. Ebtesam Al Ketbi]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 15 Apr 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate></item><item><title><![CDATA[China and the Current Escalation in the Gulf: Can Beijing Mediate the Iran-US Conflict?]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p style="text-align:justify;">The Pakistani foreign minister, together with his Chinese counterpart, has put forward a five-point peace initiative aimed at resolving the conflict involving Iran, the United States and Israel. The goal is to prevent further escalation, ensure the security of the Strait of Hormuz and global supply chains, and create space for diplomatic dialogue.&nbsp;</p>]]></description><link>https:/epc.ae/details/featured/china-and-the-current-escalation-in-the-gulf-can-beijing-mediate-the-iran-us-conflict-</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https:/epc.ae/details/featured/china-and-the-current-escalation-in-the-gulf-can-beijing-mediate-the-iran-us-conflict-</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[China Research Unit]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Thu, 09 Apr 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate></item><item><title><![CDATA[The Israeli Perspective on the Iran War: Sustaining Military Operations and Reevaluating Objectives]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p style="text-align:justify;">A month has passed since the outset of the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, with no indication that either side intends to halt the fighting. As the war drags on, the situation has become increasingly complex, and regional mediators are working to initiate negotiations. Israel has escalated its military campaign by targeting Iranian energy installations and security centers, while continuing its strategy of eliminating key regime figures, particularly in security and political spheres.</p>]]></description><link>https:/epc.ae/details/featured/the-israeli-perspective-on-the-iran-war-sustaining-military-operations-and-reevaluating-objectives</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https:/epc.ae/details/featured/the-israeli-perspective-on-the-iran-war-sustaining-military-operations-and-reevaluating-objectives</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Israel and Palestine Studies Unit]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 06 Apr 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate></item><item><title><![CDATA[Pakistan, the BoP and ISF in Gaza: Interests and Challenges]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p style="text-align:justify;">Pakistan views joining the Board of Peace (BoP) as an opportunity to enhance its influence with Washington, expand its role in Middle Eastern affairs and support stability in the Gaza Strip – thus advancing both its strategic interests and political aspirations on the international stage.</p>]]></description><link>https:/epc.ae/details/featured/pakistan-the-bop-and-isf-in-gaza-interests-and-challenges</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https:/epc.ae/details/featured/pakistan-the-bop-and-isf-in-gaza-interests-and-challenges</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Asia Research Unit]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate></item><item><title><![CDATA[Repercussions of the War Against Iran on Syria: Opportunities and Risks]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><span style="color:hsl(210, 29%, 18%);">Syria, like other countries in the region, is facing profound security repercussions due to the ongoing war against Iran. Its strategic position between Lebanon and Iraq – where Hezbollah and pro-Iranian militias are increasingly active – has prompted Damascus to deploy troops along its borders with Iraq and Lebanon to prevent spillover into Syrian territory. However, there are no indications that Syria intends to dismantle Hezbollah’s infrastructure in the Bekaa Valley.</span></p>]]></description><link>https:/epc.ae/details/featured/repercussions-of-the-war-against-iran-on-syria-opportunities-and-risks</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https:/epc.ae/details/featured/repercussions-of-the-war-against-iran-on-syria-opportunities-and-risks</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[The Levant Studies Unit]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Tue, 31 Mar 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate></item><item><title><![CDATA[The Shia Wandering in Lebanon: Who Will Inherit Leadership After Nasrallah?]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><span style="color:hsl(210, 29%, 18%);">The war to support Gaza has led to a decline in Hezbollah’s dominance over the Shia community in Lebanon, particularly after the loss of Nasrallah’s charismatic leadership, the erosion of the party’s deterrence power and the depletion of its financial resources and social network, which had previously provided it with loyalty and support from its popular base. The war has also brought to the forefront internal power struggle within the party, reflected in recent restructuring and leadership appointments.</span></p>]]></description><link>https:/epc.ae/details/featured/the-shia-wandering-in-lebanon-who-will-inherit-leadership-after-nasrallah-</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https:/epc.ae/details/featured/the-shia-wandering-in-lebanon-who-will-inherit-leadership-after-nasrallah-</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Jad Yateem]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 13 Mar 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate></item><item><title><![CDATA[Israeli Armament and Military Spending Post-Gaza War: Is Military Self-Sufficiency Attainable for Israel]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p style="text-align:justify;">Benjamin Netanyahu has proposed a plan to gradually reduce US military aid over the next decade and prioritize domestic manufacturing. This initiative has raised concerns about whether the Israeli economy can sustain military self-reliance without external assistance, especially from the United States.</p>]]></description><link>https:/epc.ae/details/featured/israeli-armament-and-military-spending-post-gaza-war-is-military-self-sufficiency-attainable-for-israel</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https:/epc.ae/details/featured/israeli-armament-and-military-spending-post-gaza-war-is-military-self-sufficiency-attainable-for-israel</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Israel and Palestine Studies Unit]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 25 Feb 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate></item><item><title><![CDATA[The Conclusion of the Federal SDF Project in Syria: Impact on Suwayda and the Coast]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>The swift retreat of Kurdish forces in northeastern Syria marked a significant shift in the Syrian landscape, with potential implications for the Alawites in the coastal region and the Druze in the south. Both communities will need to reassess their positions in light of these new developments.</p>]]></description><link>https:/epc.ae/details/featured/the-conclusion-of-the-federal-sdf-project-in-syria-impact-on-suwayda-and-the-coast</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https:/epc.ae/details/featured/the-conclusion-of-the-federal-sdf-project-in-syria-impact-on-suwayda-and-the-coast</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[The Levant Studies Unit]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 06 Feb 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate></item><item><title><![CDATA[The Strategic Partnership Agreement Negotiations Between the EU and the UAE: Opportunities and Expectations]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p style="text-align:justify;">On December 15, 2025, the UAE and the European Union formally announced the launch of talks to finalize a Strategic Partnership Agreement. This development marks a significant milestone in strengthening relations between the two sides across key areas of mutual interest, particularly as it coincides with ongoing negotiations on a free trade agreement.&nbsp;</p>]]></description><link>https:/epc.ae/details/featured/the-strategic-partnership-agreement-negotiations-between-the-eu-and-the-uae</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https:/epc.ae/details/featured/the-strategic-partnership-agreement-negotiations-between-the-eu-and-the-uae</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Cinzia Bianco]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 04 Feb 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate></item><item><title><![CDATA[Implications of Developments in Eastern Syria for Iraq: Challenges Posed by ISIS and the SDF]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p style="text-align:justify;">Once the Syrian army advanced into regions east of the Euphrates previously controlled by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), two critical issues emerged. The first concerned the future of SDF fighters and their affiliates from the withdrawing Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), whether through continued combat or negotiated arrangements. The second centered on the fate of numerous ISIS members and families detained in approximately 25 camps and facilities in Syria, overseen for years by the SDF with US support.</p>]]></description><link>https:/epc.ae/details/featured/implications-of-developments-in-eastern-syria-for-iraq-challenges-posed-by-isis-and-the-sdf</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https:/epc.ae/details/featured/implications-of-developments-in-eastern-syria-for-iraq-challenges-posed-by-isis-and-the-sdf</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Iraq Studies Unit]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 04 Feb 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate></item><item><title><![CDATA[The Collapse of the SDF East of the Euphrates and the Emergence of a New Military and Political Landscape in Syria]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p style="text-align:justify;">Within just two weeks, Syrian government forces successfully dislodged Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) fighters from several areas, including Aleppo, Maskanah, Deir Hafer, Tabqa and the surrounding regions in Raqqa. They then advanced east of the Euphrates River, effectively confining the SDF to two geographically separated enclaves in Hasakah Governorate and Ayn al-Arab (Kobani). This rapid shift has significantly altered Syria’s power dynamics, following a fragile agreement that was reached on January 20 between President Ahmed al-Sharaa and SDF leader Mazloum Abdi.&nbsp;</p>]]></description><link>https:/epc.ae/details/featured/the-collapse-of-the-sdf-east-of-the-euphrates-and-the-emergence-of-a-new-military-and-political-landscape-in-syria</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https:/epc.ae/details/featured/the-collapse-of-the-sdf-east-of-the-euphrates-and-the-emergence-of-a-new-military-and-political-landscape-in-syria</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[The Levant Studies Unit]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 28 Jan 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate></item><item><title><![CDATA[Protests in Iran: Stuck in Traditional Fault Lines or Marking a Turning Point Toward Political Change]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p style="text-align:justify;">The protests that erupted in Iran in early January 2026 rank among the most extensive and violent in the past 50 years. The initial wave subsided after more than two weeks, largely due to the government’s harsh tactics, including widespread repression and severe restrictions on communication among protesters and between Iran and the outside world. The exact number of casualties remains unknown, as authorities imposed a complete blackout on social media and communication networks, cutting off mobile phone and SMS services and blocking external communications. International monitoring groups estimate the death toll at around 500, with some sources suggesting it could be as high as 2,000. Opposition sources claim the figure is even higher.</p>]]></description><link>https:/epc.ae/details/featured/protests-in-iran-stuck-in-traditional-fault-lines-or-marking-a-turning-point-toward-political-change</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https:/epc.ae/details/featured/protests-in-iran-stuck-in-traditional-fault-lines-or-marking-a-turning-point-toward-political-change</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Iran Studies Unit]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 19 Jan 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate></item><item><title><![CDATA[The Crisis in Homs and Sectarian Issues in the New Syria: The Need for a National Political Framework]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In the post-Assad era, Syria faces significant societal challenges that expose the fragile balance between different social groups and the new government. A murder in Zaidal, a town in the Homs countryside in November 2025, escalated into a sectarian crisis that spread into security tensions and public protests along the coastal region. The bombing of the Imam Ali bin Abi Talib Mosque in the Wadi al-Dhahab neighborhood of Homs on December 26, 2025, further deepened existing sectarian divides. These incidents illustrate how local events can quickly evolve into national security threats, underscoring the need for proactive policies that extend beyond immediate crisis response.</p>]]></description><link>https:/epc.ae/details/featured/the-crisis-in-homs-and-sectarian-issues-in-the-new-syria-the-need-for-a-national-political-framework</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https:/epc.ae/details/featured/the-crisis-in-homs-and-sectarian-issues-in-the-new-syria-the-need-for-a-national-political-framework</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[The Levant Studies Unit]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Thu, 15 Jan 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate></item><item><title><![CDATA[The Clash of Corridors in the South Caucasus]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p style="text-align:justify;">The South Caucasus has emerged as one of the main arenas in the broader competition over transport routes across Eurasia. The August 8 Agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan, signed in Washington under US auspices to implement the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) initiative, if realized, would boost East-West connectivity, thereby strengthening the influence of Turkiye, the EU and the United States in the Caucasus and Central Asia. This development, in turn, heightens the importance of the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), promoted by Russia and Iran, as a potential counterbalancing route.</p><p>&nbsp;</p>]]></description><link>https:/epc.ae/details/featured/the-clash-of-corridors-in-the-south-caucasus</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https:/epc.ae/details/featured/the-clash-of-corridors-in-the-south-caucasus</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Asia Research Unit]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 02 Jan 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate></item><item><title><![CDATA[The Turkish Role in Rebuilding Syria’s Military and Security Capabilities]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>Turkiye is intensifying efforts to restructure its military and security presence in Syria, focusing on training personnel to enhance combat readiness in response to evolving regional dynamics. Ankara perceives a growing security threat, particularly its competition with Israel for influence in Syria. Against this backdrop of internal and external pressure, Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa's administration views collaboration with Turkiye as the most viable option, given its access to weapons, security expertise and longstanding ties with opposition groups.</p>]]></description><link>https:/epc.ae/details/featured/the-turkish-role-in-rebuilding-syria-s-military-and-security-capabilities</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https:/epc.ae/details/featured/the-turkish-role-in-rebuilding-syria-s-military-and-security-capabilities</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[The Levant Studies Unit]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Tue, 30 Dec 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate></item><item><title><![CDATA[Dismantling the Financial Arsenal of the Lebanese Hezbollah: Measures and Effectiveness]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p style="text-align:justify;">Disarming Hezbollah remains a central priority for international and regional actors pressuring Lebanon's current government. Breaking down the financial networks that sustain the group’s military operations and sponsorship activities is essential to dismantling its military and security structure. This task poses significant challenges for Lebanese authorities, especially amid mounting American pressure to take concrete steps to curb Iranian influence in Lebanon. Measures such as disarmament, anti-money laundering initiatives and monetary reforms are viewed as necessary to counter Hezbollah’s reliance on the cash economy to covertly finance its activities.</p>]]></description><link>https:/epc.ae/details/featured/dismantling-the-financial-arsenal-of-the-lebanese-hezbollah-measures-and-effectiveness</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https:/epc.ae/details/featured/dismantling-the-financial-arsenal-of-the-lebanese-hezbollah-measures-and-effectiveness</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Jad Yateem]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Tue, 23 Dec 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate></item><item><title><![CDATA[Israel’s Growing Military Drive to Disarm Lebanese Hezbollah: Are We Approaching a Moment of Explosion?]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p style="text-align:justify;"><span style="color:hsl(210, 29%, 18%);">Efforts by the Lebanese state to disarm Hezbollah have reached a dead end, with the party clinging to its weapons and even rebuilding its arsenal. The Lebanese army has hesitated to advance toward dismantling Hezbollah’s capabilities north of the Litani River, fearing such a move could spark widespread internal conflict. Meanwhile, regional and international pressure on Beirut to enforce a state monopoly on arms has intensified.</span></p>]]></description><link>https:/epc.ae/details/featured/israel-s-growing-military-drive-to-disarm-lebanese-hezbollah-are-we-approaching-a-moment-of-explosion-</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https:/epc.ae/details/featured/israel-s-growing-military-drive-to-disarm-lebanese-hezbollah-are-we-approaching-a-moment-of-explosion-</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[The Levant Studies Unit]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Thu, 18 Dec 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate></item><item><title><![CDATA[Implications of Sharaa’s Visit to Washington for His Regime’s Domestic and Regional Position]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p style="text-align:justify;">Syrian interim President Ahmed Sharaa’s visit in November to Washington reinforced his international legitimacy, highlighting the Trump administration’s sponsorship of his leadership and reflecting its intent to give Syria an opportunity to avoid civil war while maintaining a delicate balance on contentious Syrian issues.</p>]]></description><link>https:/epc.ae/details/featured/implications-of-sharaa-s-visit-to-washington-for-his-regime-s-domestic-and-regional-position</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https:/epc.ae/details/featured/implications-of-sharaa-s-visit-to-washington-for-his-regime-s-domestic-and-regional-position</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[The Levant Studies Unit]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 17 Dec 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate></item><item><title><![CDATA[UNSC Resolution on Peace in the Gaza Strip: Opportunities and Challenges Facing the Implementation of Trump’s Plan ]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p style="text-align:justify;">On November 17, 2025, the UN Security Council endorsed US President Donald Trump’s plan&nbsp;to end the war in the Gaza Strip through&nbsp;Resolution 2803. The resolution was backed by 13 countries, with Russia and China abstaining. &nbsp;<strong>&nbsp;</strong></p>]]></description><link>https:/epc.ae/details/featured/unsc-resolution-on-peace-in-the-gaza-strip-opportunities-and-challenges-facing-the-implementation-of-trump-s-plan-</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https:/epc.ae/details/featured/unsc-resolution-on-peace-in-the-gaza-strip-opportunities-and-challenges-facing-the-implementation-of-trump-s-plan-</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Israel and Palestine Studies Unit]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 12 Dec 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate></item></channel></rss>